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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL K. MILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
COCA COLA BOTTLING 
COMPANY OF OGDEN, 
a corporation, and 
SAFEW A Y STORES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9161 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
SAFEWAY STORES, INC. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Daniel K. Milligan, hereinafter referred to as ((Milli-
gan", plaintiff below, brought this action against the Coca 
Cola Bottling Company of Ogden, one of the defendants 
below, hereinafter referred to as ((Bottling Company" and 
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Safeway Stores, Inc., the other defendant below, hereinafter 
referred to as ((Safeway". 
At the pretrial, Safeway moved for a Summary Judg-
ment on the ground that the pleadings and deposition of the 
plaintiff showed that Safeway was entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law (R. 15). This motion was granted (R. 
17). Counsel for plaintiff did not appear at the pretrial, 
having advised the trial judge that he would stand on his 
complaint. 
For the purpose of convenience the record will be re-
ferred to by ((R". We will refer to Milligan's deposition 
by HD". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A few days prior to February 27, 1959, Milligan pur-
chased two cartons of Coca Cola from the Safeway Stores, 
Inc., at 24th Street and Monroe, Ogden, Utah. The Safe-
way store at that location is a self-service store (D-13). 
Plaintiff selected the cartons of ((coke" from a stack or 
shelf in the store and paid for them at the check stand 
(D-15). He took the cartons to his home, placing them 
in the fruit room (D-15) . The fruit room is located at 
the end of Milligan's garage which is attached to his house 
(D-1 0). The door to the fruit roof was not locked with a 
key (D-12) . On some occasions plaintiff's garage door 
was left open while his car was parked in the garage (D-12). 
Milligan purchased the cartons of ((coke" for a birthday 
party (D-40) . On the night of the party, about February 
27th, Milligan had some relatives over who felt free to go 
out to the fruit romn and get their own ((coke" (D-45). 
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All of the bottles of Coca Cola purchased at Safeway were 
consumed between February 27, 1959 and March 31, 1959, 
except one. On the evening of March 31, some five weeks 
after the Coca Cola had been purchased, Milligan went to his 
fruit room and got the last bottle of ((coke" (D-17). Milli-
gan had consumed about half of the contents of the bottle 
when some object lodged in his throat (D-8). Milligan's wife 
drove him to the hospital where a physician groped around 
in this throat causing him to swallow the object (D-9). 
The X-rays taken at the hospital disclosed that Milligan had 
swallowed a square paper clip (D-9). The last X-ray taken 
disclosed that the paper clip had entered Milligan's big 
colon and that was the last trace of it (D-9). A second 
paper clip was found in the bottle of Coca Cola when it 
was examined by a laboratory technician at the hospital (D-
17). Milligan remained at the hospital one night and was 
taken home the next afternoon. Milligan never did inform 
Safeway that the bottle of Coca Cola which he drank in his 
home on the evening of March 3 1, 19 59, contained two 
paper clips (D-15) . 
Milligan's complaint against Safeway and the Bottling 
Company was grounded on three theories: ( 1) res ipsa lo-
quitur; (2) violation of the adulterated food statutes; and 
( 3) implied warranty. On the basis of the facts and the 
law applicable to Milligan's theories the trial court granted 
a motion for Summary Judgment as to Safeway. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE 
ARISING AGAINST SAFEWAY UNDER THE DOC-
TRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
POINT II 
SAFEWAY DID NOT VIOLATE THE FOOD, 
DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT OF UTAH. 
A. THE SALE• OF ADULTERATED FOOD IS 
NOT NEGLIGENCE PER SE. 
B. SAFEWAY HAD .A GUARANTY FROM 
THE BOTTLING COMPANY WHICH MAKES 
THE FOOD, .DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT 
INAPPLICABLE TO SAFEWAY. 
POINT III 
MILLIGAN FAILED TO GIVE SAFEW AY NO-
TICE OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AS 
REQUIRED BY SECTION 60-3-9 U. C. A. (1953) 
WHICH IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO HIS 
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST SAFEWAY. 
POINT I 
THERE IS NO INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE 
ARISING AGAINST SAFEWAY UNDER THE DOC-
TRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
The Bottling Company manufactured the bottle of 
((coke" and sold it to Safeway. Safeway then sold the bottle 
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to Milligan who stored the bottle in his fruit room for ap-
proximately five -weeks before he opened it. These facts are 
uncontroverted. They conclusively show that Safeway did 
not have the necessary control over the bottle of Coca Cola 
to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has analyzed and applied 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a number of cases. See 
3, U tab Law Review 113, rry he Res Ipsa Loquitur Doctrine 
In Utah." In the case of Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Com-
pany, 117 Utah 578, 218 P. 2d 660, 52 A. L. R. 2d 108, 
this court held that: 
cc ••• the only time that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitor should apply to a csealed product' in the lat-
ter category is when the plaintiff has shown that there 
was an absence of opportunity for tampering so that 
in effect the court could conclude that there was 
extended control over the product by the manufact-
urer until it reached the ultimate consumer; or when 
the product passes directly from the manufacturer 
to the .consumer without passing through intermediate 
hands." 
Under the holding of the Jordan case, supra, the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur could not be applied to Safeway 
because it did not have control over the bottle from the 
time it was bottled until it reached the ultimate consumer. 
In the case of Matievitch v. Hercules Powder Company, 
3 Utah 2d 283, 282 P. 2d 1045, this court held that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to a situation 
when the plaintiff, employed by the cement company as pow-
der man, was injured by a .cap and stick of dynamite of 
defendant's manufacture that exploded as he placed them in 
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the drill hole. There was no evidence as to how or why the 
dynamite exploded, no evidence as to when or how it was 
manufactured and none as to how or by whom it had been 
handled or treated prior to use. There was evidence that 
the plaintiff handled the dynamite in a manner other than as 
recommended by instructions which accompanied the con-
tainers in which they were packaged. 
The court rejected plaintiff's theory of res ipsa loquitur 
and made the following statement: 
ctPlaintiff urges that the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur is applicable under the circumstances recited. 
We cannot agree. To do so would be to impose ab-
solute liability and insurability upon manufacturers 
of explosives and perhaps most any other commodity. 
To do so would be to extend the fact or fiction of 
control necessary to invoke the doctrine to an un-
reasonable, impractical and unrealistic degree, where 
mere injury could dispense with plaintiff's burden of 
proving a defendant's negligence, even where it would 
be impossible for defendant to show freedom there-
from. 
Safeway submits that to extend the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur to a food retailer would uinvoke the doctrine to 
an unreasonable, impractical and unrealistic degree where 
mere injury could dispense with plaintiff's burden of proving 
defendant's negligence." 
It appears from a review of the Utah cases that this is 
the :first time this court thas been confronted with the ques-
tion of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be 
applied to a retailer of foods as distinguished from the bottler 
or mmzufacturer. 
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The Jordan case supra has been annotated in 52 A.L.R. 
2d at page 117. At page 122 the annotator makes the fol-
lowing observation: 
HAs to whether a submissible case on the ques-
tion of negligence on the part of a retailer (as dis-
tinguished from a bottler or manufacturer) of a 
beverage sold in a sealed container is made out by 
proof of the presence of a foreign substance in the 
beverage, there is relatively little authority. Holdings 
both ways are to be found, but it seems fairly safe 
to state that, because of the remoteness of the retailer's 
activities from the contents of the containers of bev-
erages he sells, very few courts would hold that he 
could be .charged with negligence on evidence showing 
no more than the presence of a foreign substance in 
a beverage sold by him; indeed, the paucity of deci-
sions dealing with the retailer's negligence would ap-
pear to reflect a recognition of this fact by plaintiffs' 
counsel, if not by plaintiffs themselves." 
While the annotator states that ((holdings both ways 
are to be found", an examination of the annotation shows 
that there are only two Georgia cases where it has been held 
that a retailer could be found negligent by the trier of the 
facts when there was proof of a foreign substance in a bev-
erage sold in a bottle or other sealed container. Each of these 
cases have been over-ruled. In Davis v. Williams, 198 S. E. 
357, (Georgia 1938) the Court of Appeals of Georgia Di-
vision #I held that a presumption of negligence on the part 
of the retailer of coca cola arose from proof that a bottle of 
coca cola sold by the retailer contained particles of glass. 
Also, in Cordell v. Macon Coca Cola Bottling Co., 192 S. E. 
288, (Georgia 1937) the Court of Appeals of Georgia Divi-
sion #1 held that whether defendant retailer was guilty of 
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negligence in selling a bottle of Coca Cola which contained 
flies was a question of fact for the jury. However, in 
the later case of Moree v. Shiver, 12 S. E. 2d 118 (Georgia 
1940) the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division #2, held 
that it was error for the court to instruct the jury that the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable to a retailer of a 
bottle of Coca Cola which contained pieces of glass. In the 
Moree .case, supra., the plaintiff brought suit against the Al-
bany Coca Cola Bottling Company and Moree, the retailer 
of the bottle. With regard to the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur the court said: 
uThe [trial] court charged, as applicable to 
both defendants, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
and that the jury could consider whether this doc-
trine applied. In the bottling company case we held 
that the charge was not error as to the bottling com-
pany. The evidence presents a different situation as 
respects the applicability of this doctrine to the case 
as against Moree. As, from the nature of the case, 
the act of Moree in serving to the plaintiff a bottle 
of coca cola with glass in it, which Moree did not bot-
tle but which he bought from the bottling company, 
could not in itself be negligence, but would be neg-
ligence only when done under circumstances which 
would show negligence on the part of Moree, the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable. It 
was therefore error for the court to give in charge 
this doctrine as applicable to the case as made against 
Moree." 
In the Moree case supra, the Court of Appeals of Geor-
gia, Division #2, refused to follow the earlier decisions pro-
nounced by Division # 1 of the Court of Appeals. In view 
of the decision in the Moree case, supra, the only cases hold-
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ing that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine 1S applicable to re-
tailers have been over-ruled. 
The annotation points out that the absence of cases 
against retailers indicates that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
is not applicable to a purveyor of food. The reason for not 
applying the doctrine to a retailer of food in a ((sealed con-
tainer" is that it does not have control over the container 
when it is filled and sealed. In the absence of evidence that 
the retailer was in fact negligent in tampering with the bot-
tle or leaving the bottle where it could be contaminated, it 
cannot be held liable on the theory of res ipsa loquitur merely 
by proof that a bottle contained a foreign substance which 
injured the plaintiff. 
Thus, in the case of Blount v. Houston Coca Cola Bottl-
ing Company, 185 So. 241 (Miss. 1939), plaintiff brought 
suit against the manufacturer and retailer of a bottle of Coca 
Cola for personal injuries. The evidence disclosed that the 
plaintiff became ill after drinking a part of a bottle of 
Coca Cola, which contained a portion of a mouse or bird in 
the bottom of the bottle. The trial court gave a peremptory 
instruction in favor of the retailer. The Supreme Court of 
Mississippi held that the instruction was proper stating: 
((The peremptory instruction in favor of the re-
tailer was correct, since the suit as to both the manu-
facturer and retailer was predicated on alleged negli-
gence, and not on an implied warranty as to the 
wholesomeness of the beverage and there were no 
facts shown that would constitute negligence on the 
part of the retailer, or from which negligence could 
be inferred." 
Also, in the case of Wilkes v. Memphis Grocery, 134 S. 
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W. 2d 929 (Tennessee 1939) the C0urt of Appeals of Ten-
nessee held that the evidence was insufficient to present a 
jury question as to a retailer's negligence when there was 
nothing in the appearance of a bottle which would have 
put the retailer on notice that it was unfit for human 
consumption. Here plaintiff brought suit against the bottler 
and retailer for personal injuries alleged to have resulted from 
drinking a bottle of Pepsi-Cola which contained dead flies 
and other foreign substance. At the conclusion of plaintiff's 
proof defendant's motions for directed verdicts were granted. 
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that the directed 
verdict as to the retailer was proper stating: 
((As to the other defendants, there is no proof 
of negligence, or any facts shown upon which a rea-
sonable inference of negligence could be based. The 
retailer is not liable to the consumer under any im-
plied warrant of food products that are purchased 
by him in the original containers and sold at retail 
to a customer, where there is nothing in the appear-
ance of the package or the container that would put 
him upon notice that it was impure or unfit for 
human consumption." 
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is founded on at least two 
elements: ( 1) The accident must be of a kind which ordi-
narily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence, 
and (2) it must be caused by an instrumentality under the 
control and n~anagen'tent of the defendant. 3 U tab Law 
Review 114. Appellant states in his brief: ((As has been point-
ed out in cases which will be cited herein the requirement of 
exclusive control is that the bottling cmnpany have exclusive 
control at tbe tiJne the deleterious substance is introduced 
into said bottle. The appellant recognizes that the Bottling 
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Company and not the retailer has control at the time the 
bottle is filled and launched on its commercial course. It is 
at this time when a foreign substance is most likely to be 
introduced into the bottle in the absence of direct evidence 
of tampering. In order to hold the retailer negligent under 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the fact finder would have 
to indulge in unfounded speculation that some prankster 
tampered with the bottle while it was in the control of the 
retailer. Such speculation is just as unwarranted against the 
retailer as it is against the consumer. The trial court proper-
ly ruled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inappli-
cable to Safeway. 
POINT II 
SAFEW.A Y DID NOT VIOLATE THE FOOD, 
DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT OF UTAH. 
A. THE SALE OF ADULTERATED FOOD IS 
NOT NEGLIGENCE PER SE. 
Section 4-26-3, U. C. A. ( 1953) states: 
((Prohibited acts.-The following acts and the 
causing thereof within the State of Utah are pro-
hibited: 
1. The manufacture, sale, or delivery, holding 
or offering for sale of any food, drug, device, or cos-
metic that is adulterated or misbranded. 
2. The adulteration or misbranding of any food, 
drug, device, or cosmetic. 
3. The receipt in commerce of any food, drug, 
device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded, 
and the delivery or proffered delivery thereof for pay 
or otherwise. ::· ::· *" 
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111 the Utah case of Niemann vs. Grand Central Mar-
ket, Inc., 9 Utah 2nd 46, 337 P. 2d 424, this court held that 
the Adulterated Food Statute could be used as a basis for a 
civil suit against a seller of foods. The court made the fol-
lowing observation: 
((This Utah statute is representative of legislative 
pronouncements enacted to protect the public health 
by the imposition of legal sanctions upon those who 
purvey, for public consumption~ adulterated food. 
To fully implement this intent these statutes are con-
strued so as to best effectuate their purpose. Prior in-
terpretatio11s of this type statute have stated that civil 
liability is based on the same elements as criminal 
liability and may be based simply upon proof of vio-
lation of sucb a statute and violation may result even 
though there be no knowledge of the food's harmful 
propensities on the part of those responsible for its 
sale." (Italics ours) 
According to the language used by Justice McDonough, 
civil liability is based on ·the same elements as criminal lia-
bility and may be based upon proof of violation of such a 
statute. 
In the Nie1nann case supra plaintiffs brought suit for 
damages resulting from trichinosis allegedly contracted from 
meat sold by the defendant. Plaintiff purchased ground beef 
from defendant's market. The meat was mixed with raw egg 
and eaten uncooked by the plaintiffs. Some ten days later 
the plaintiffs were afflicted with trichinosis. Trichinae lar-
vae, which cause this disease, are found only in raw pork, 
among the foods commonly eaten by man. Plaintiff's evi-
dence showed that defendant's meat department ground both 
beef and pork with the same grinder and that beef was often 
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ground after pork sausage had been processed. Although 
defendant's employees testified that the grinder was disman-
tled and cleaned after use with a different type of meat, 
plaintiff contended that the defendant failed to properly 
clean the grinder after pork had been ground, allowing par-
ticles to become mixed with the ground beef. The case was 
submitted to the jury with the instruction that sale of ground 
beef containing pork which is infested with trichinae larvae 
is a violation of the Utah statute prohibiting the sale of 
adulterated foods. A jury verdict for the plaintiff was af-
firmed by the court. 
The ratio decidendi of the Niemann case is that the 
defendant market sold to plaintiffs ground beef which con-
tained trichinae infested pork and this meat caused the dam-
age complained of. The defendant's negligence was in failing 
to properly clean the meat grinder. The defendant market 
was, in effect, the manufacturer and there was sufficient 
evidence upon which the jury could find negligence. It is 
submitted that the holding of the Niemann case is not 
authority for the proposition that the sale of an adulterated 
food, in and of itself, is enough to constitute negligence per 
se. 
In the case of Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 3 5, 
327 P. 2d 822, this court held that a supplier of pork was 
not absolutely liable under the adulterated food statutes for 
selling unfinished pork to a retailer when the retailer was 
to complete the processing. The evidence in the Suhnnann 
case disclosed that the supplier of pork had informed the 
retailer that he could not continue to supply processed pork, 
but the retailer requested the supplier to continue the ship-
ments and that he, the retailer, would finish the processing. 
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This court held that even though the supplier knew that 
unfinished pork was dangerous and might contain trichina, 
that the supplier, in the absence of knowledge that the retailer 
was selling unfinished pork to the public, was not liable to 
the retail customer who contracted trichinosis from eating 
pork. The court stated: 
((The second contention is that the selling of un-
cooked pork containing trichina violates Sees. 4-20-5 
and 8, U. C. A. 19 53, prohibiting the sale of impure 
and adulterated food products. Plaintiff avers that 
violation thereof results in absolute liability, even 
without proof of negligence. On those two points this 
further observation is pertinent: this product, al-
though potentially dangerous in one stage of its proc-
essing as are many food products, is quite harmless 
if the preparation for consumption is completed. Un-
der the circumstances here described, the supplier was 
entitled to assume that reasonable care and prudence 
would be exercised in regard to the product and was 
not obliged to anticipate that it would be handled by 
the retailer in a manner which was dangerous or in 
careless disregard of the safety of others." 
This court recognized that even though there was a sale 
by the supplier of an adulterated food that there was not a 
violation of the statute where the supplier ((was entitled to 
assume that reasonable .care and prudence would be exercised 
in regard to the product and was not obliged to anticipate 
that it would be handled by the retailer in a manner which 
was dangerous or in careless disregard of the safety of others." 
This court refused to accept plaintiff's argument that a 
technical violation of the statute results in absolute liability 
even without proof of negligence. Even though there was a 
sale by the supplier to the retailer of an adulterated food, 
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the supplier was not liable when he could assume that the 
retailer would finish the processing. 
Safeway was also entitled to assume that the Bottling 
Company had exercised reasonable care and prudence in the 
handling of its product. Safeway was not obliged to an-
ticipate that the bottling process had been conducted in 
such a manner that a foreign substance was introduced into 
the bottle. 
B. SAFEWAY HAD A GUARANTY FROM THE 
BOTTLING COMPANY, WHICH MAKES THE FOOD 
AND DRUG ACT INAPPLICABLE TO SAFEWAY. 
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic .Act of Utah provides that 
a retailer may protect itself from the prohibitions of the Act 
by procuring a guaranty or undertaking signed by and 
containing the name and address of the person residing in 
the State of Utah from whom he received the article to the 
effect that such article is not adulterated. The statutory 
language is as follows: 
Section 4-26-5: ((Violation-Misdemeanor-Defen-
ses-Dissemination of Advertising - 1. Any person 
who violates any of the provisions of section 4-26-3 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
2. No person shall be subject to the penalties 
of subsection 1 of this section, for having violated 
subsection 1 or 3 of section 4-26-3 if he establishes 
a guaranty or undertaking signed by, and containing 
the name and address of, the person residing in the 
state of Utah from whom he received in good faith 
the article to the effect that such article is not adul-
terated or misbranded within the meaning of this act, 
designating this act. * ::· ::·" 
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Safeway had a guaranty from the bottling company 
which fully conformed with the statute. (R 28-29) 
The guaranty statute (Section 4-26-5 U.C.A. 1953) 
shows a legislative intent to afford sellers a means of protect-
ing themselves from liability when they sell food or drink in 
a sealed container. 
The statute providing the seller with an opportunity to 
obtain a guaranty from the food bottler or manufacturer 
shows that liability may be charged to the party who packed 
the food originally. The fact that this statute states that the 
seller having a guaranty signed by and containing the name 
and address of the person residing in the State of U tab from 
whom he received in good faith the article to the effect that 
such article is not adulterated, shows that the legislature in-
tended that the manufacturer or packer of the goods should 
be responsible to the ultimate consumer and not the seller. The 
requirement that the guarantor must reside in Utah indicates 
that a resident of the State of Utah could bring suit here and 
would not be charged with the onerous task of sueing in a 
foreign state. The principal that where one of two innocent 
parties should bear a loss the party who initiated the instru-
mentality whi.ch caused the loss should respond underlies the 
reasoning of the guaranty statute. Justice McDonough in the 
N ehnann case supra stated that civil liability is based on the 
same elements as criminal liability and may be based simply 
upon proof of violation of such a statute. The statute con-
strued by the court in the N eimann case supra was a criminal 
statute. A guaranty, by relieving the seller of the penalties 
imposed by the statute, relieves the seller of any criminal 
liability. If there is no criminal liability which can be imposed 
upon the seller, then, the reasoning of Justice McDonough 
would indicate that there is no ground for civil liability. 
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The cases cited by appellant in his brief are not applic-
able to the question before this court regarding the effect of 
the guaranty statute (Section 4-26-5 U.C.A. 1953). In none 
of the cases referred to by appellant was there an express 
legislative pronouncement that a party could be relieved of 
a violation of a statute by obtaining a guaranty. On the other 
hand, in the case of Donaldson vs. Great Atlantic and Pacific 
Tea C01npany, 199 S.E. 213, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
stated that where a food retailer had a guaranty from the 
manufacturer the retailer would not be guilty of negligence 
per se even though he sold adulterated food. 
In the Donaldson case supra an action was brought by 
Mrs. Donaldson for injuries resulting from the consumption 
of alleged unwholesome food purveyed by the defendant. The 
evidence showed that the defendant sold some pig's liver to 
the plaintiff's daughter, which was on the same day cooked 
and eaten by the plaintiff's family, all of whom became ill 
on the following morning. Plaintiff's suit was grounded upon 
a violation of the Georgia statute which provided in part: 
((Section 105-1101 Georgia Code- Any person 
who knowingly or carelessly sells to another unwhole-
some provisions of any kind, the defect being un-
known to the purchaser or his family, shall be liable 
in damages for such injuries." 
The Georgia Pure Food and Drug Act also provided: 
((Section 42-115, Georgia Code - No dealer 
shall be prosecuted under the provisions of this title 
when he shall establish a guarantee signed by the 
wholesaler, jobber, manufa.cturer, or other party re-
siding in the state from whom he purchases such ar-
ticles, to the effect that the same are not adulterated 
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or misbranded within the meaning of this title desig-
nating them. :".- ::- *" 
The Supreme Court of Georgia noted that plaintiff's 
petition alleged that the pig's liver was in a deleterious and 
unwholesome condition and unfit for food. The court stated 
that these allegations were sufficient to show a violation of 
the duty imposed by the statute not to sell ((adulterated" food 
as defined therein. That court then made the following state-
ment: 
~~The first question includes reference to Section 
4 2-115 (statute concerning guaranty) . That section 
does not impose any duty whatever upon a seller of 
foods, or upon any one. It merely provides that no 
dealer shall be prosecuted under the provisions of the 
statute if he shall establish a prescribed guaranty 
signed by the person from whom he purchased. Un-
der this section a dealer selling food which is adul-
terated within the meaning of the statute would not 
violate its provisions, and there/ore would not be 
guilty of negligence per se, if he had obtained the 
prescribed guaranty; but the guaranty would not re-
lieve him.from the liability referred to in Section 105-
1101 (statute imposing liability for selling adulter-
ated food), if he is negligent as a matter of fact, in 
selling unwholesome food by the use of which another 
is injured. It follows that Section 42-115 (statute con-
cerning guaranty) merely creates an exception to the 
statute in favor of those who obtain and establish the 
guaranty; and the plaintiff in this case was not re-
quired to negative such exception in her petition; its 
existence in a particular case being a matter for de-
fense." (Italics ours) . 
The language of the Donaldson case supra that a retailer 
selling adulterated food would not be negligent per se if he 
had the prescribed guaranty was quoted with approval in the 
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later Georgia case of Burns vs. Colonial Stores, 83 S.E. 2d 259. 
In that case plaintiff and his wife purchased some meat at 
defendant's store. The plaintiffs prepared the meat in a 
goulash and after it was consumed the plaintiffs became ill. 
The plaintiff brought suit against defendant charging that: 
(a) the defendant sold food to the plaintiff which contained 
added poisonous and deleterious ingredients rendering it unfit 
for food, thus being negligence per se as a violation of the 
Georgia Code; (b) sale of adulterated food consisting of 
filthy, decomposed and putrid animal substance, thus being 
negligence per se as a violation of the Georgia Code; and other 
acts wherein the defendant had failed to warn the plaintiff of 
the meat's condition, and not inspecting the meat when it was 
sold to the plaintiff. With regard to the question of the 
guaranty obtained by the defendant grocery store from the 
supplier of the meat the court quoted the following language 
from the Donaldson case: 
((Under this section a dealer selling food which 
is adulterated within the meaning of the statute would 
not violate its provisions, and therefore would not be 
guilty of negligence per se, if he had obtained the 
prescribed guaranty; ::- ,z. ::-" 
The court noted, however, that the defense to the charge 
of negligence per se of having obtained a guaranty was raised 
neither by the pleadings nor by the evidence in the case. The 
court stated that it was error for the court to charge the jury 
that such a guaranty would be a defense to plaintiff's com-
plaint where the guaranty was neither pleaded nor proved. 
In the case at bar, Safeway presented the guaranty agree-
ment to the pretrial judge. The guaranty was discussed at the 
pretrial. Counsel for Safeway urged that no civil liability 
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could be imposed upon Safeway, in view of the fact that the 
guaranty had eliminated Safeway's criminal liability. 
Through oversight this guarantee was not introduced into 
evidence at the time of the pretrial. However, by subsequent 
motion and notice the trial judge admitted the guaranty into 
evidence and it is now contained in the record at uR" 28-29. 
Safeway contends that the guaranty statute of the State of 
Utah shows a legislative intent to relieve sellers of liability for 
the sale of adulterated foods. It is submitted that in the case 
at bar there is no violation of the statute by Safeway and, 
therefore, the statute is not applicable to this defendant. 
POINT III 
MILLIGAN FAILED TO GIVE SAFEW AY NOTICE 
OF THE BREACH OF WARRANTY AS REQUIRED 
BY SECTION 60-3-9 U.C.A. (1953), WHICH IS A 
CONDITIO·N PRECEDENT TO HIS CAUSE OF AC-
TION AGAINST SAFEWAY. 
The Sales Act imposes a duty upon a buyer of goods to 
give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or 
warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or 
ought to know, of such breach. The Act provides that if the 
buyer does not give notice of such breach, then the seller shall 
not be liable therefor. 
Section 60-3-9, U.C.A. (1953) provides: 
((Acceptance does not bar action for damages.-
ln the absence of express or implied agreement of the 
parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall 
not discharge the seller from liability in damages, or 
other legal remedy for breach of any promise or war-
ranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But if, after 
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acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice 
to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty 
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or 
ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be 
liable therefor." (Italics ours) 
The deposition of Milligan clearly shows that he did not 
give Safeway notice of the breach of any warranty. 
Mr. Thatcher: 
(tQ. Did you ever report this incident at the store?" 
Mr. Milligan: 
(tA. No, sir." 
Safeway knew nothing of the alleged breach of warranty 
until it was served with a copy of the summons and com-
plaint. 
In Mawhinney vs. Jensen, 120 Utah 142, 232 P. 2d 769, 
this court stated that timely notice is a vital condition prece-
dent to an action for breach of warranty. In that case the 
plaintiff buyers, brought suit to recover the value of personal 
property which they alleged was fraudulently removed from 
the premises between the time of the execution of an earnest 
money agreement and the final uniform real estate contract 
for the sale of a hotel owned by the defendants. One of plain-
tiff's .claims to recover damages for the shortage of personal 
property was based on the theory of a breach of an express 
warranty. The complaint stated that one of the defendants 
((represented and warranted to the plaintiffs that all of the 
stock that was on the premises at the time of the execution of 
the earnest money agreement was still there or had been re-
placed.* * *"Plaintiff's second cause of action was framed as 
a breach of warranty arising from the failure of the heating 
system on the premises to conform to the standard of quality 
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imputed to it by the defendants. This Supreme Court stated 
that the pleadings upon the two causes of action dealing with 
warranty were defective because they did not show that the 
plaintiff buyers had given notice to the seller of the breach of 
warranty. This Court stated: 
((The pleading upon these two matters is fatally 
defective as a matter of law under the Sales Act 
adopted in Utah. Section 81-3-9, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1943, provides in part: (But if, after accep-
tance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to 
the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty 
within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or 
ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be 
liable therefor.' 
((A survey of the cases on this matter shows that 
timely notice is a vital condition precedent to an ac-
tion for breach of warranty." (Italics ours) 
The court concluded that defendant's demurrer was 
properly sustained on the two claims for breach of warranty. 
Although the Mawhinney case supra did not treat the 
problem of the sale of food under an implied warranty, the 
cases applying the statute requiring notice to the seller of a 
breach of warranty, uniformly hold that a buyer of food 
seeking to hold the seller on the theory of implied warranty 
must give reasonable notice of the breach of warranty. 
In the case of Vogel vs. Thrifty Drug Company, 272 
P. 2nd I (Sup. Ct. of Calif., 1954) an action was brought to 
recover for personal injuries resulting from glass present in 
an ice cream soda served plaintiff by the defendant drug 
company. Plaintiff's original complaint was grounded only in 
negligence. On the day the case was to go to trial the plaintiff 
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served the defendant with a copy of a proposed amendment 
to her complaint. The defendant objected to the amendment 
to plaintiff's complaint and the trial court denied plaintiff's 
motion to amend. The question before the Supreme Court 
was whether the trial court had abused its discretion in refus-
ing to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint. The amended 
complaint stated a new cause of action based on the theory of 
breach of an implied warranty of fitness upon which the 
plaintiff relied in eating the ice cream. The court noted that 
the pleading did not contain a direct allegation nor did it al-
lege facts from which an inference could be drawn that the 
notice required by the California Code (identical to Section 
60-3-9, U. C. A. 1953) was given. Plaintiff argued to 
the California Supreme Court that all the facts necessary 
to support a recovery upon the theory of implied war-
ranty were set forth in the amended complaint and that 
she was therefore entitled to have the warranty theory sub-
mitted to the jury. The Supreme Court stated that in making 
that argument plaintiff overlooked an essential element to 
stating a cause of action for breach of implied warranty, i.e., 
an allegation that plaintiff gave notice of the breach to the 
defendant within a reasonable time. The court set out the 
notice statute referred to above and then made the following 
observation: 
((One of the purposes of the provision in the U ni-
form Sales Act was to ameliorate the harshness of the 
common law rule in some states that the mere accep-
tance by or passage of title to the buyer of the 
goods constituted a waiver of any and all remedies 
for breach of warranty, and at the same time to give 
the seller some protection against stale claims by 
requiring notice. ::· ::· * The sales act on its face clearly 
applies to the sale of food *::·* for immediate human 
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use or consumption. ::- * :-... In determining that there 
in an implied warranty that the food is fit for· human 
consumpiton under the statutes. dealing with the law 
of the sales of goods, it is accepted that the sale of 
food for immediate human consumption is a sale of 
goods under the statute.' It further appears (The clear 
and practically unbroken current of authority estab-
lishes the doctrine that the requirement of notice, to 
be given by the vendee charging breach of warranty, 
is imposed as a c&ndition precedent to the right tore-
cover and the giving of notice must be pleaded and 
proved by the party seeking to recover for such 
breach.' " (Italics ours) 
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in refusing to permit. the plaintiff to amend its 
complaint. 
DeLucia vs. Coca Cola Bottling Company of Connecti-
cut, 89 A. 2d 749 (Sup. Ct. of Errors of Conn. 1952) is a case 
which illustrates the general rule that the notice statute is 
applicable to the sale of foods. In this case the plaintiff became 
ill after drinking a bottle of Coca Cola. He sued the bottling 
company alleging two causes of action, one grounded in neg-
ligence and the other in breach of contract. The trial court 
found for the defendant on the plaintiff's theory of negli-
gence and found for the plaintiff on his theory of breach of 
contract. The defendant appealed, claiming that it was not 
notified of the breach of contract and that in the absence of 
such notice the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. 
The defendant admitted that it impliedly warranted that 
the beverage was fit for human consumption. The court dis-
cussed the facts and concluded that there was no evidence in 
the record to support a finding that plaintiff notified de-
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fendant of the breach of an implied warranty. The court 
stated: 
ttThe warranty, which the defendant concedes it 
impliedly gave, attached to the purchase of the bev-
erage by virtue of the Sales Act. General Statutes 
6630. A section of ~hat act provides, in part, that 
tif, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to 
give notice to the seller of the breach of any * * :~o 
warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer 
knows or ought to know of such breach, the seller 
shall not be liable therefor.' 6664. This section sets 
up a condition precedent to a buyer's right to re-
cover. 3 Williston, Sales (Rev. Ed.) p. 39. The buyer 
must plead and prove the giving of notice." (Citing 
cases) (Italics ours) 
The court held that inasmuch as the plaintiff had failed 
to plead or prove notice of the breach that he was not entitled 
to recover on his theory of breach of contract. 
In 46 Am Jur p. 43 8, the following rule is enunciated: 
((Statutory Requirement of Notice. - In prac-
tically every jurisdiction the provisions of the state 
statute requiring notice of breach of warranty are the 
same as §49 of the Uniform Act. The courts uni-
formly hold under such statutory provisions re-
quiring notice of breach of warranty (within a reason-
able time after the buyer knows or ought to know of 
such breach,' that as a prerequisite to a recovery for 
a breach of warranty, the purchaser must give notice 
to the seller of such breach within a reasonable time 
after he knew or under the circumstances should have 
known of the breach.'' (Italics ours) 
An annotation contained in 71 A.L.R., p. 1149, states 
that the courts uniformly hold that under the notice section 
of the Sales Act requiring a notice of breach of warranty 
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((within a reasonable time after the buyer knows or ought to 
know of such breach" that, as a prerequisite to a recovery for 
breach of warranty, the purchaser must give notice to the 
seller of such breach within a reasonable time after he knew 
or under the circumstances, should have known of the breach. 
Milligan failed to make any allegation in his complaint 
that notice was ever given to Safeway of a breach of an im-
plied warranty. The record conclusively shows that the 
plaintiff never did notify Safeway of the incident which took 
place in his home on the evening of March 31, 19 59. The 
cases and rules referred to above demonstrate that Milligan's 
failure to give notice of the breach of warranty precludes any 
cause of action against Safeway on the theory of implied 
warranty. The cases state that the giving of such notice is a 
condition precedent to a cause of action against the seller 
and that in the absence of an allegation of notice in plaintiff's 
complaint he has no cause of action against the seller on the 
theory of implied warranty. 
CONCLUSION 
The undisputed facts in this case show that the bottling 
company manufactured a bottle of coca cola, sold it to Safe-
way, who in turn sold it to Milligan. The bottle of ttcoke" 
was in Milligan's possession for approximately five weeks be~ 
fore it was opened. In order to impose liability on Safeway, 
Milligan must show that Safeway violated some duty or 
breached a contract. It seems obvious that Milligan cannot 
invoke a doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to show a violation of a 
duty. Safeway did not have the necessary control to warrant 
the application of the doctrine. Neither can Milligan show a 
violation of a duty by use of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
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Act. Safeway had the prescribed guaranty which relieves it 
of any violation of the Act. Safeway is not liable to Milligan 
for breach of an implied warranty. Milligan failed to comply 
with the mandate of the statute that notice of a breach of 
warranty must be given to a seller within a reasonable time 
after the buyer knows or ought to know of such breach. Such 
notice was a condition precedent to a claim against Safeway 
for breach of implied warranty. Safeway was the ccmiddle-
man" in this transaction and should not be liable to Milligan 
under any theory. 
In the case of Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad 
Company, 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P. 2d 339, this court stated that 
if disputed issues of fact would not establish a basis upon 
which plaintiff could recover, no matter how such issues were 
resolved, summary judgment should be entered for the de-
fendant. Even if the issues of fact are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, Safeway was entitled to a summary 
judgment as a matter of law. 
The order granting the motion for summary judgment 
as to Safeway was proper and should be affirmed. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Safeway Stores, Inc. 
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